Airbus Seeks Production Stability Before Stretching The A220

When Airbus received all the regulatory approvals in 2018 to take over a majority stake in what was the Bombardier C Series program, then-Airbus CEO Tom Enders was full of praise. “The strength of the entire Airbus organization will be behind the C Series,” he promised at the time. “Not only will that enable this outstanding aircraft to fulfill its market potential, but [the C Series] brings significant value to Airbus, our customers and shareholders.” The aircraft, Airbus argued, “is positioned to capture a large percentage of the estimated 6,000 aircraft needed in this market segment over the next 20 years.”

Seven years later, the program, since renamed the Airbus A220, is near crisis mode. In 2024 the A220 program gained only 17 new orders while suffering 26 cancellations for a net loss of 11 orders following some overdue backlog-clearing exercises. Airbus delivered 75 A220s last year, far short of earlier targets, largely because of its fragile supply chain and some in-house issues. The in-service fleet is partially grounded while operators await fixes and upgrades as well as replacement of Pratt & Whitney PW1500G engines. Those engines have to be removed after sometimes ridiculously few hours on wing due to the durability issues that have plagued the geared turbofan (GTF).

• The A220 is “not yet the success” for which Airbus had hoped
• COVID-19, engine durability and supply chain problems are holding back sales
• Airbus remains committed to its 2026 production target

Airbus is also facing the daunting task of finally fixing the external A220 production system at the same time as the airframer prepares to take over Spirit AeroSystems’ workshare in the program this summer. Of course, all of this is happening as Airbus strives to reach its targeted rate of 14 A220s per month next year. Few believe that is possible, and some argue it is not even wise to expand at such a pace.

Moreover, the value that Enders cited in 2018 has not materialized to a significant degree, either financially or strategically, as a decision about a stretched version similar in size to the A320neo or the Boeing 737-8 has been shifting to the right.

The Long Ramp

Airbus had sold 904 A220s as of the end of February, 396 of which have been delivered. With large orders from the likes of Breeze Airways, JetBlue Airways, Air Baltic, Swiss, Delta Air Lines, Air France and Lufthansa City Airlines, the momentum is clearly better than when the program was still owned by Bombardier in its early years. But it is also fair to say that it has not yet taken off to the extent that many at Airbus had anticipated.

Launched initially as a two-version family, the A220 is now being sold de facto as a one-type aircraft, the A220-300. There have been 98 total orders for the smaller -100, 69 of which have been delivered, but none of the more recent commitments have included the type. Orders for the A220-100 are largely in line with the weakest members of the A320/A320neo family: The A318, no longer on offer, has seen 80 firm orders; the A319neo, 57.

• See also: Airbus A220 Pilots Share Positive Feedback

In hindsight, the timing was unlucky. Airbus acquired the program for a symbolic C$1 (plus Bombardier financial support in the early years) near the peak of the last cycle. “Then [Airbus] lost three years because of COVID-19,” Agency Partners analyst Sash Tusa says. “In the circumstances, it is hard to focus on an individual program.”

COVID-19 was followed by horrendous problems in rebuilding a disrupted supply chain and fixing the engines. And the A220 already had its own structural problems.

“One perceived advantage was that the supply chain was different from that of Airbus,” Tusa recalls. “People thought that this is a good thing. But the sad truth has been that the Bombardier supply chain has been less flexible and harder to improve than that of Airbus. Bombardier did not have a lot of leverage with its suppliers, therefore supplier deals were not advantageous.” Airbus ended up buying the A220 “with much higher costs than expected,” he added.

A Matter of Priority

There is another element to this that could be called a dirty little secret: “The A220 is not a priority for Airbus,” Tusa says. Moving A320neo-family production up to where it should be is far more important for the financial performance of the company and its already strained relationships with some key customers. The same is probably true for Pratt & Whitney’s work on the GTF—most of the effort has gone into the PW1100G, as will the comprehensive updates of the Advantage version.

For Airbus, the equation is likely to change soon. It is in the process of acquiring parts of Spirit AeroSystems, including those that manufacture A220 fuselage sections and wings.

“The acquisition is really a big problem,” Tusa says. The Airbus operations within it “are horribly loss-making,” he notes, adding: “Airbus has little choice other than to buy this, but it starts to make A220 losses material.”

At its Belfast facility in Northern Ireland, Spirit is building the A220 wings, including the control surfaces, and the midfuselage sections. It also has some smaller work packages.

“If you are a manufacturer, you kind of need to make the biggest pieces of your airplane yourself,” Air Lease Corp. (ALC) President and CEO John Plueger says.

The broader task is to bring the A220 up to a record rate of 14 aircraft per month. The 75 delivered in 2024 are equivalent to a rate of just over six per month. Late last year, when Airbus was committed to meeting its overall delivery targets, it handed over eight aircraft in October, 12 in November and 10 in December. As is usual seasonally, deliveries fell off to five each in January and February.

Daniel Wenninger, senior vice president of the A220 program, says he is “optimistic” nonetheless that more than doubling production is possible in such a short period. He sees a more stable supply chain, apart from what he calls “spots in aerostructures,” referring mainly to Spirit’s difficulties. “Internally, we have all the means,” Wenninger says. “We are trying to get ahead of the curve.” Airbus has also been hiring people early to ensure it has enough workers to deal with the larger volume.

But some ramp-up tactics used for other Airbus programs previously are proving difficult to apply to the A220. Airbus has typically tried to “stress-test” its production system by temporarily ramping up to the target rate early to find pain points. But “as long as we have bottlenecks in the supply chain, we cannot stress-test our own system,” Wenninger says. The exercises are called “run-at-rate simulations.”

How U.S. tariffs on aerospace products or their parts are changing the equation is another story, and it is not clear yet. Delta, one of the largest A220 customers, said it will not take aircraft subject to tariffs. As far as industrial facilities are concerned, sites in Mirabel, Quebec, and Mobile, Alabama, can handle the higher rates. In Mirabel, Airbus has added two positions for cabin integration and now has four based in the former CRJ final assembly plant to allow for “more flexibility to cope with traveled work and nonconformity [issues],” Wenninger says.

The output increase will be staggered between Mobile and Mirabel because Airbus does not want to risk running into the same issues at the same time in both places and wants to be able to counteract and adapt first before systemwide implementation.

Having bought 67 A220-300s and nine -100s, ALC is one of the biggest A220 customers. “The airplane itself performs its mission well, but it has had a couple of handicaps,” Plueger says, referring to the engine issues. “A lot of the operators of the A220s are not the Deltas or the Air Canadas of the world. They are smaller operators, and that’s important to the A220 program. The engine situation has impacted the A220 more than the A320 and the A321neo series just by virtue of the types of customers.”

As for the Spirit takeover, Plueger’s says his comment to Airbus as a customer is: “‘OK, you are taking it. Run with it—do better.’ It is easy to point fingers at Spirit or other suppliers and say you are not performing.” Plueger is also a member of the current Spirit AeroSystems board of directors.

ALC’s decision to buy the type in the first place was not necessarily a given, since the size of the market was not obvious, and lessors tend to favor the largest-volume types, such as the A320neo or the 737 MAX. For the same reason, lessors are not as prolific in the widebody market.

“We think there’s enough of a niche for that airplane just below the A320 level,” Plueger says. In spite of the relatively slow pace of orders, he is still behind the program: “I think the fundamental reasons that led Airbus to buy that program for $1 are going to win out over time,” he says.

Another industry executive concludes that “the A220 has not yet turned into a success for Airbus.” A220 sales have also been hampered by the GTF issues; premature corrosion has been discovered on some airframes.

Positive Reviews 

David Neeleman’s latest airline venture, Breeze Airways, is following exactly the business model for which the A220 seems to be best suited: thinner routes on which the A320neo or the 737-8 are too large. Consequently, Breeze has placed orders for 90 A220s, and by the end of February, it had taken delivery of 31 directly from the manufacturer, plus nine more through lessor orderbooks.

“On our A220s, we have 103 fewer seats than on an A321 at maximum capacity,” Neeleman says. “We can fly into cities that don’t make sense for larger airplanes.” Breeze has 12 first-class and 40 extra-legroom seats for a premium-heavy cabin.

When the low-cost carrier took its first A220, “it was a new aircraft in the U.S., which caused us a lot of issues,” Neeleman recalls. Breeze started with a small fleet of used Embraer 190s, a type its founder knew well from his days at JetBlue. They are useful as backstop capacity but are still being phased out in 2026.

JetBlue, which has also introduced the A220, is full of praise for the aircraft. “We love the A220-300,” Chief Financial Officer Ursula Hurley says. “We would definitely be interested in a potential stretch.”

“I think it is a tool that airlines around the world have a need for,” Avolon Chief Risk Officer Jim Morrison says. “It is finding its place in the market.” That place could be serving the less-in-demand routes in big networks, such as Air Canada’s or Delta’s, or to become the main (and sometimes only) type for midsize airlines serving smaller markets, such as Air Baltic.

Air France is a particularly interesting case. Even 15 years after the launch of the A320neo program, the airline has not ordered the current generation of the A320 family yet. Instead, Air France has started replacing its A319s with a large fleet of A220-300s that are now operating across its European network, much like Delta is using them in its North American hub-and-spoke system.

Air France, Delta and JetBlue are also among the drivers of an airline customer campaign to convince Airbus to offer a stretched version of the A220. The stretch has been an important strategic asset from the start in 2018 in the bigger-picture battle between Airbus and Boeing in the narrowbody market. In the early 2010s, Airbus essentially forced Boeing into launching the 737 MAX. It has since expanded its share of the narrowbody market, largely based on the capabilities of the A321neo, which has become the dominant player in the segment and currently accounts for 62% of the A320neo family backlog.

Stretch Potential 

If the A321neo was the first step in Airbus’ latest strategic move against Boeing, the A220 stretch could be the second. Most operators see the 737-8 as at least on par with and maybe slightly better than the A320neo in terms of operating performance and costs, depending on the mission. That is also reflected in market acceptance: Boeing has received 3,925 orders for the -8, according to Aviation Week Network’s Fleet Discovery database. Airbus shows 4,106 orders for the A320neo.

The balance could shift further in Airbus’ favor if it could offer an aircraft that would be roughly the same size but better than the A320neo. This is where the A220 stretch comes into play, an option that even Bombardier had considered for the long term in its CS 500 studies more than 10 years ago. It would enable Airbus to challenge the 737-8 with an aircraft that would presumably offer lower operating costs.

“The platform has the potential for a longer fuselage,” Wenninger says.

Strategically, the A220 stretch would also mean that Airbus would have to accept losing A320neo orders to internal competition. In addition, its next narrowbody, penciled in for arrival in the second half of the next decade, would be larger in capacity than the current A320neo family—but that is more or less a given anyway.

A stretched version also has drawbacks, though. Given its Bombardier heritage, the A220 stretch would have little or no commonality with the A320neo or any future narrowbody Airbus might launch. That could be a showstopper for some, particularly smaller airlines. The biggest economic and operational obstacles for the A220 stretch are the current state of the aircraft, its production woes and ongoing struggles to make its supply chain more robust and less costly at the same time.

For years, Airbus has had a standard answer when asked about the additional A220 version. The program is “a question of ‘when,’ not ‘if,’” Airbus Commercial CEO Christian Scherer is used to saying. But the “when” keeps shifting to the right and is now not expected until after production has been ramped up and supply chain issues have been ameliorated.

The postponed “when” is not the only complaint of key potential customers. There are also some unanswered design issues to sort through. Fundamentally, airlines like Delta and Air France have suggested that Airbus proceed with a simple stretch that would focus on the lowest possible operating costs and probably offer less range than the A220-300, which can fly up to 3,400 nm, according to the airframer. Delta does not need that range because its main U.S. hubs are centrally located, and Air France also does not need the longer range because its European routes are even shorter than Delta’s.

The situation is slightly different for Breeze and JetBlue, at least in terms of potential future use. JetBlue flies A321LRs across the Atlantic, and Breeze’s Neeleman has talked about possibly introducing the A220 on long-haul flights eventually. While Breeze had looked at an extended-range version of the A220-300 for that purpose initially, a suitably designed stretched variant would offer greater passenger and revenue potential.

Airbus appears to be continuing to debate the issue internally. Traditionally, the airframer has tended to ensure that range is not compromised when aircraft are stretched. The range of the larger baseline A321neo—4,000 nm—is markedly more than the A320neo’s 3,400 nm. The A321XLR flies up to 4,700 nm, and the A350-1000 can operate as far as 8,900 nm, compared with 8,500 nm for the A350-900. An exception is the A330-800, with 8,150-nm-range, compared with the A330-900’s 7,200 nm.

But more range typically translates into higher weight, which airlines try to avoid.

“It is not clear to me which way Airbus goes [on the A220],” says Rick Deurloo, president of commercial engines at Pratt & Whitney. “We will adapt either way.”

Stretch Power

Another key question is what engine Airbus would use. “We are very happy with the dual-engine configuration we have on the A320neo,” Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury told Aviation Week in June 2023 (AW&ST June 19-July 2, 2023, p. 46). “If we could, over time, have a dual-engine option—especially with a new variant being the -500, that is one thing we would really like to see.”

This could open the door for CFM International to join the A220. There has been talk about CFM offering an engine that incorporates some early technology elements developed for the Revolutionary Innovation for Sustainable Engines (RISE) project that is mainly intended to power an A320neo and 737 MAX successor in the 2030s. Presumably, CFM would also be interested in powering the A220-300, since the size of the -500 market could be too small, particularly when shared with Pratt & Whitney.

Introducing more radical elements of the RISE program, such as the open fan, would likely require a redesigned wing, work that would increase development costs considerably.

“The key is the engine,” one senior industry official says.

The stretch project could be used as an opportunity “to reengineer A220 production,” Tusa says. It may also simply be a necessity to sustain the production rate of 14 aircraft per month in the long run. “A stretch with the range of the -300 would be very attractive for many airlines,” Tusa notes.

But Airbus does not appear to be considering major changes for the stretched version beyond the engine. “The industrial system was built with this in mind,” Wenninger says. “We want to keep it as stable as possible.”

That phrase commonly used inside Airbus when it comes to the stretch project—“not a question of ‘if,’ but ‘when’”—has taken on a different connotation in the meantime. The “when” has for years been interpreted as something like “sooner rather than later.” Given where things stand with the supply chain and the engines, that view might be changing.

“Airbus is too focused on other things,” one industry executive says.