U.S.-China Security Relations Enter A Dangerous Period

The Trump Administration is poised to take power at a time when—at least in Pentagon planning terms—conflict with China could be on its doorstep and security cooperation is deepening between Beijing and Moscow, as well as Tehran and Pyongyang.

In the early days of the Biden administration, the Pentagon started worrying that Chinese President Xi Jinping wanted his military to be ready to invade Taiwan this decade, accelerating that goal from 2035. Adm. Phil Davidson, who was then commader of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned lawmakers in the spring of 2021 that conflict might loom as early as 2027. The timeline has become known as the Davidson Window.

The second Trump administration will release a budget request soon after taking office. But the reality of financial planning means that sweeping changes will not occur until the subsequent fiscal 2027 funding request. Effectively, the programs on the books now thus will define what will be available, should that war scenario play out.

National security preparations for confronting China have been in the works for years, spanning multiple administrations and predating President-elect Donald Trump’s first four years in the White House. That could suggest that Biden-era efforts to contain China may endure, such as key pieces of the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the UK in areas such as nuclear submarines and hypersonic weapons.

To some extent, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has become a catalyst for the Pentagon to prepare for military confrontation in Asia. The fighting has highlighted the need for deep stocks of weapons and informed key investments in areas such as higher solid-rocket motor output and increased missile interceptors. Lockheed Martin, for instance, plans to bring production capacity of its latest Patriot PAC-3 interceptors to 650 units per year in 2027 from under 400 in 2023.

The war in Ukraine also has put into even sharper focus the utility of swarms of low-cost loitering attack munitions and similar systems for imposing heavy costs on an adversary. The U.S. and countries like Taiwan have put more emphasis on adding those to their arsenals, although there are still questions about how applicable those relatively short-range systems would be in a fight spanning a 110-mi.-wide waterway.

China, for its part, has been routinely flying military aircraft close to Taiwan. In one case in October, China flew 153 aircraft near Taiwan, 111 of which crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, Taipei said.

Beijing used the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai to showcase its advances, displaying systems such as the Cloud Shadow CS-5000T stealthy combat uncrewed aircraft system and disclosing that the CH-7 uncrewed combat air vehicle prototype is flying.

The Philippines are emerging as another potential flash point with China, as Beijing is contesting territory that Manila considers its own. The tensions have strengthened ties between Washington and the Philippines, leading the U.S. Army in April to deploy its Mid-Range Capability, which can launch a land-based version of the RTX Tomahawk cruise missile and the Standard Missile 6, in the country for the first time.

Washington’s desire to focus more on Asia is not novel, however, and hot spots elsewhere have a record of reasserting themselves—including in the Middle East. The continued fighting between Israel and some of its neighbors suggests that will not change in the coming year.

Europe, too, is not likely to recede entirely as a strategic issue for the Trump administration, even if the White House ends support for embattled Ukraine, as Trump has threatened. European countries have pledged to sustain their backing for Ukraine, which would create a competition for production resources that could challenge Washington’s ability to increase inventory depth for a standoff with China.