Podcast: NASA’s Starliner Saga

Listen in as editors explain why a crew vehicle is coming home from the space station without a crew, and what it means for Boeing, SpaceX and two stranded astronauts.

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Transcript

Joe Anselmo:

Welcome to the Check 6 Podcast. I'm Joe Anselmo, Aviation Week's editorial director and editor-in-chief of Aviation Week magazine.

Ten years ago this September, NASA awarded contracts to Boeing and SpaceX to transport crews to and from the International Space Station, replacing the retired space shuttle. Under the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing received a $4.2 billion fixed price contract, and SpaceX received $2.6 billion.

SpaceX launched its first crew to the Space Station on its Dragon spacecraft in May of 2020, but it would take Boeing's Starliner four more years to reach the station with a crew, with astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams finally docking on June 6th for an eight-day stay.

They're still up there. Thruster problems and a series of small helium leaks have NASA unsure whether it's safe to bring the two astronauts back to Earth in the Starliner capsule. On August 24th, Administrator Bill Nelson announced the agency will bring the spacecraft back in September without a crew. Wilmore and Williams will have to stay put on the Space Station until next February, when they will finally come home -- on a SpaceX Dragon.

Here to explain this saga is Aviation Week's senior space editor and Cape Canaveral bureau chief Irene Klotz. And joining Irene is our chief business editor, Michael Bruno, who will talk about Boeing's space business and what incoming CEO Kelly Ortberg might do with it.

Irene, let's start off with the basics. Why did Administrator Nelson make this call to bring Starliner home empty?

Irene Klotz:

Hi, Joe. You know, we were going to do this podcast probably two months ago, and it's been a saga ever since launch, shortly after the crew lifted off on a ULA Atlas 5. Part of the mission was to do some manual operations of Starliner, and in doing that, the thrusters apparently were very sensitive, and had much more use than what had been anticipated.

The next day, when Starliner made an approach to the station, five of the thrusters failed off. NASA paused, took a little more time to look at it, waited another orbit. The thrusters recovered enough. They docked and went on with the crew flight test. That set off a real scurry on the ground to understand what had happened. Before launch, there was one small helium leak in the Starliner propulsion system. Later on, it turned out to be, ahead of docking, additional leaks in the propulsion system. Those were not understood, either.

So, the mission went on, ostensibly still within a two-week period. NASA assured everybody that they were confident and Starliner was safe to come back. And then things started kind of unraveling from there. NASA wanted a lot more data on it. There was testing done at White Sands on a thruster that hadn't yet flown on a Starliner system, and all of that led to Saturday, and Senator Nelson and a team of top NASA managers had a press conference and announced that it was a unanimous decision that NASA was not comfortable bringing Suni Williams and Butch Wilmore home on the Starliner, and decided to opt for the other ride available, a SpaceX Crew Dragon.

One thing that really struck me in the press conference was the very direct mentions of the shuttle accidents and the missteps that NASA had during both the Challenger accident and the Columbia accident, and how dissenting views either were not listened to or, even back during Challenger, never even got to the point where people could raise concerns they had. And in light of that, and because this Commercial Crew Program has successfully produced at least one operational system, aside from the Soyuz spacecrafts that NASA had been using to fly crews until the Crew Dragon was ready, NASA really didn't have a choice. They were not going to take any kind of risk with the crew's lives, and that's led to where we are today.

Boeing has been quite steady and unwavering that Starliner is safe to return. They understand the dynamics of what's happening. They're confident that the thruster performance will continue, as it's been tested on the ground and in space, a couple times now, and all will be well. However, they are deferring to NASA on this, even though it is their program to own and operate. NASA's their customer, and they left the decision to NASA. And that's where it is today.

Joe Anselmo:

So, Irene, SpaceX has launched eight crews to the Space Station for NASA, and you can correct me on this, but it's about a handful of private flights to the station. Why is this so routine for SpaceX, a 22-year-old company, and yet so hard for Boeing, a pioneer of the space age?

Irene Klotz:

Well, that's the trillion-dollar question, I'm sure. One of the big differences between the companies is SpaceX is completely vertically integrated. When they have a problem, everything is at their disposal. They have an amazing computer system that is tracking every piece of hardware, everything that's ever done to every piece of hardware, and they make most of the hardware.

Boeing, of course, uses a much more traditional supplier base, so there's always a lot of integration. These thrusters that are being intensely probed now are made by Aerojet Rocketdyne now, and L3 Harris companies, so there's a lot of coordination. And then, I guess, bigger picture, one of the things that I've noticed with just SpaceX over the years is that I wouldn't call SpaceX an aerospace company. They are primarily a software company that evolved to be able to produce and operate space hardware. And I think at their core, they operate with a very different mindset than Boeing.

And then the last thing I'd mention is that I do still think Boeing is suffering from being in a cost-plus award mindset, and not fixed price. It's very different, if you're in charge of your program, to say, "Well, no, this is what we're going to do." And they're in this very kind of bizarre situation now, because NASA can basically dictate what it needs Boeing to do, and then Boeing pays all the bills for it.

Joe Anselmo:

Michael Bruno, you follow Boeing from a business perspective. The space business often is overshadowed by the much larger commercial airplane and defense operations. What's your take on this whole thing from a business point of view?

Michael Bruno:

This has become a real sore point for Boeing, and Boeing's got a lot of sore points these days, for sure. The headlines are full of the commercial airplane division's problems. There's certainly been plenty of headlines in past years about the defense programs that have run amok. The KC-46A aerial refueling tanker, MQ-25, T-7 trainer program. Problems kind of left and right in these major programs that Boeing is contracted under over the past decade, decade and a half. But one of them, of course, is commercial crew, the CST-100 Starliner, and this one doesn't receive as many headlines, but there's an irony here I will just point out, and I don't think I'm the only one here. Every time the Starliner flies and has a problem, Boeing has to get a new CEO. Now, that's just coincidence, of course. But it does speak to the prominence that this program can have, when the Starliner goes up.

There's been so much invested in this. This dates back, in some ways, to the Obama administration. And yet, Boeing is still struggling. And while it doesn't necessarily impact the bottom line of Boeing so much, particularly in comparison to the big problems that Boeing is having with commercial aircraft and other programs, what it does is it begins to stick out as a decision point that Boeing, with its new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, must face as they strategically reposition this company going forward. Essentially, it becomes a question of how much do you want to invest in space? How much are you willing to be either a prime player or a supplier? Or do you want to get out of it completely?

This comes as there are other issues being considered. For instance, it is widely reported, and we believe, that United Launch Alliance, which is a rocket joint venture that Boeing owns half of, is up for sale. It's been up for sale for a couple of years, and there have been a lot of reports about who might be interested in it and trying to buy it. It hasn't sold yet. But, you know, it's one indication that Boeing, to some degree or another, is always evaluating how much it wants to be in space.

And you can say a big company like Boeing is always evaluating its portfolio. Yeah, that's true, except that Boeing, as an OAM prime, doesn't necessarily divest assets as quickly as somebody such as a service provider. L3 Harris Technologies, that grew up sort of as a Sears catalog of providing services and products, they'll divest something very quickly. When Boeing decides to maybe get out of something, they're going to get out of it. Remember, Boeing once operated an airline. So, you can get out of something that seems like it's your core product, and they'll do it if they decide strategically it's worth doing.

Joe Anselmo:

So, they've lost so much money on this Starliner program already. Could Boeing just throw in the towel? I mean, Bill Nelson said otherwise. Right, Irene?

Irene Klotz:

Yes, the Administrator was very clear that he fully expects Boeing to continue with the program. Yeah, it's kind of a mystery, but NASA wants this, for sure, and there's a little irony in that the whole commercial program wouldn't have existed if Boeing hadn't agreed to participate in the program at the beginning. Congress was very reluctant to fund this effort, and they wanted NASA to down-select from the get-go, and they did not want to pick SpaceX. SpaceX was not very popular on the Hill then. Charlie Bolden told this to us during a podcast a few years back. He was quite involved in all of this. So, you know, there may be a lot to it.

And I don't know. I disagree with Michael a little bit about Boeing and space. You know, they're the prime contractor for the Space Launch System. They're the prime contractor for the International Space Station. There has been lots of talk about sales of ULA, but so far, nothing's happened. Lockheed is stepping up its investment in space. It just bought the Terran Orbital company. And it's hard for me to see what Boeing would really gain by divesting of ULA, and as far as Starliner, I think there's more to the program that we don't know. I think there's some of the technologies that are on Starliner were definitely borrowed from other programs. There may be parts of the program that are applicable in other Boeing programs, and I don't think it's a be all, end all.

Michael Bruno:

I do think it's ironic that what, to follow on what Irene is saying, what very well may save Boeing and keep it in this program and keep it a competition is that original drive to have competition in space that NASA started way back in the Obama administration. You know, they weren't necessarily for it at the time. In fact, they were pretty much against it. But now, it could very much come back to pretty much help them stay in the game, if that's what they want to do.

Irene Klotz:

I wanted to just add also, for NASA, this has been a total sweet deal. So, Boeing's initial $4.2 billion contract. For both Boeing and SpaceX, those initial contracts covered two flight tests and six operational missions. So, in the 10 years, and we know what's been going on in the past 10 years, the contract has only gone up. It's now $4.4 billion. Most of that has to do with some additional work that's been added over the years. Both companies had to do work on parachutes, and there's probably a little wedge for inflation. I'm not exactly sure. They don't break those figures down. SpaceX's contract originally was $2.6 billion. They now, instead of their six flights, they're now on contract for 14 flights, and their contract is $4.9 billion. So, it's been a sweet deal for the taxpayers, even if one of the providers is not yet flying crews.

Boeing has not received all of that money. NASA's I think issued task orders for three or four of the operational missions. I wrote a story yesterday about cost overruns in the mobile launcher for the upgraded version of SLS, and this is a cost-plus award fee contract that's gone from $343 million to $1.8 billion, on its way up to $2.7 billion, for a launch tower. So, there's a huge contrast in the programs NASA's running now and what it's getting from its traditional cost-plus and these commercial contracts.

Joe Anselmo:

Total coincidence, but I'm reading a book by historian Doris Kearns Goodwin and last night, I got to the account of John F. Kennedy and his vice president, Lyndon Johnson, watching Alan Shepard go into space in 1961, and Kennedy turned to Johnson and said, "Lyndon, nobody knows that you're the chair of the National Space Council, but if this mission fails, they will tomorrow." The chair of the National Space Council now is Vice President Kamala Harris, who is a candidate for president. That had to be in the back. I'm not saying it was a political decision, but that had to be in the back of Bill Nelson's mind, no?

Irene Klotz:

Well, the last question at the press conference came from a reporter who never asks political questions, and he asked that question exactly. And Bill Nelson, who is a long-time politician, said, "Absolutely not. There's a firewall around NASA." They've always claimed to be nonpartisan, and he said that that had absolutely no play. I was actually thinking that as well, because Bill Nelson is a good friend of President Joe Biden, and of course, Elon Musk has been very vocal about his opposition to the administration, and very proactive in his support for former President Trump to reclaim the White House, and I was kind of nervous about all of that playing out. But, yeah. I don't think so. I think that the ghosts of Columbia and Challenger were speaking quite loudly.

Joe Anselmo:

And one other point you had made. You had said before this decision was made, Boeing wanted to bring the astronauts back on Starliner. We keep talking about, we're moving into a commercial space economy. If this was purely a commercial mission, based on decisions where dollars and cents matter more, they might have come back, right?

Irene Klotz:

Absolutely. So, right now, the only other entity that would be overseeing spaceflight is, of course, the FAA. Right now, their oversight is limited to public safety. And if this was a private mission to a private space station, I do believe Boeing would have felt comfortable bringing the crew back.

Michael Bruno:

Joe, I just wanted to follow up in one sense in regards to this new era of competition. It's been said a million times. I'm going to say it a million and one more. Space is hard. It's so hard that we see, on a regular basis, large prime companies, some companies like Boeing, who have been doing it since the dawn of the space age, decide that, you know, some program is just too hard or just being a prime in this business is too hard, and they get out of it. Recently, RTX decided they were no longer going to be a prime in the space world. They're going to be a supplier. They're not going away. But they're not going to be angling to try to be a prime supplier anymore.

We've seen major companies like Maxar Technologies just go get taken over by private equity. These were companies who were stalwarts at one point, and primes, and they want to find a niche position. It's easier to be a supplier, because it's always easier to be a pick and shovel provider than it is to be the miner that's trying to go get the gold. So, companies are positioning themselves, and that's always one of these considerations that is probably bubbling up again as we enter this new era, where NASA and everybody else is looking for more competition and more providers. That makes it harder, so these companies, including these traditional old primes, have got to reevaluate where they want to be in this event. I think we're going to see more changes coming across the industry.

Irene Klotz:

Mike, I have a question for you about this change. You know, NASA's traditionally had a big program that it could use for the costs of the standing armies. You know, the Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center. It used to be shuttle, space station. SLS has that role now. And there is this question about what the future of the space program's going to be if NASA continues moving more and more towards this commercial services, which they're trying to do in the Artemis program. You know, using spacesuits as a service, lunar landings as a service. At that point, what's left for the government to do? Is it necessary? Where's the expertise? You know, do we want just private companies running the U.S. space program? And you know, these questions are not really addressed in any kind of public forum.

NASA tries to justify, or it has been justifying, the SLS, as opposed to using SpaceX's Starship, which of course, is still in testing. And their rationale is, well, Starship doesn't exist yet. SLS is a proven rocket. Well, by the time SLS flies next year, Starship very well may be an operational system. And then what happens?

Michael Bruno:

I think it's pretty undeniable that NASA will move the way the Defense Department has gone in regards to privatizing everything from the actual program itself to the expertise behind it on the ground. You see the Defense Department obviously spends just as much in services as it does in hardware, probably more if you include kind of how it works with operations budgeting. But the trend is definitely to turn over to the private industry everything that you can outsource, to the degree that you don't want the staffing and the hard-ass that's on the books of the taxpayers. You know? It happens in big business. It happens in government for the same reasons. It's leaner to outsource it. It's supposedly easier to adjust the size, to cut or to ramp up, when you give it over to the private industry.

So, it's not going to happen overnight. You know, they're not going to go close down Michoud or Jet Propulsion Laboratory and turn it into a totally outsourced FFRDC kind of thing. But I think over time, that's eventually where it's headed, and it's happening across the government. So, you know, people can lament or cheer it as much as they want. At NASA, I don't think it's going to happen any faster than other places, but it's certainly going in one direction only.

Joe Anselmo:

Irene, we are just about out of time, but can you bring us to the finish line by telling us what comes next? I mean, Starliner comes down empty, and then I think they have to send up new space suits, right? For these two astronauts? Because SpaceX uses different suits when they come back in February, right?

Irene Klotz:

Yes. What happens next is this week, NASA's going to lay out the plan for deorbiting Starliner without crew. Hopefully, that is successful. There's risk there, because this mission was designed to have crew in it. So, there's reconfigurations that need to happen, both in the spacecraft and in the software. Butch and Suni are now going to be long-duration ISS residents. Third missions for both of them.

And then SpaceX. NASA will launch the next crew to the space station, scheduled for September 24th. That will fly with two astronauts instead of four. They'll join with the Starliner crew in orbit, spend the six months, and come back in February. There's one spare SpaceX suit on the station now that fits one of them, Butch or Suni. NASA didn't say which. And one more suit is coming up on the Crew Dragon. Of course, they haven't been fit checked or anything, but we're in a little bit of uncharted territory here.

There's one other element to this, which is between the time Starliner returns and crew nine arrives, NASA maintains the capability to evacuate the station and have ships available as safe havens for conjunctures and other potential emergencies, and they are putting together a plan to have Butch and Suni be able to shelter on the Crew Dragon that's on the station now with the crew eight. There are no seats. There's one suit. There's a pallet. I'm not sure what that actually looks like. I've asked for a graphic. I don't know if they're going to bungee cord them on there, or what the story is. But for NASA to say that that is a preferred situation to bringing the crew back on Starliner I think says everything we need to know about NASA's position in this.

Joe Anselmo:

And on that note, we will wrap up. Irene, Michael, thanks so much for sharing your insights today with our listeners. A special thanks to our podcast editor in London, Guy Ferneyhough. To our listeners, if you've enjoyed our episode so far, please consider supporting us by writing a review on Apple Podcasts. Thank you for your time, and join us again next week for another Check 6.

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Joe Anselmo

Joe Anselmo has been Editorial Director of the Aviation Week Network and Editor-in-Chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology since 2013. Based in Washington, D.C., he directs a team of more than two dozen aerospace journalists across the U.S., Europe and Asia-Pacific.

Irene Klotz

Irene Klotz is Senior Space Editor for Aviation Week, based in Cape Canaveral. Before joining Aviation Week in 2017, Irene spent 25 years as a wire service reporter covering human and robotic spaceflight, commercial space, astronomy, science and technology for Reuters and United Press International.

Michael Bruno

Based in Washington, Michael Bruno is Aviation Week Network’s Executive Editor for Business. He oversees coverage of aviation, aerospace and defense businesses, supply chains and related issues.