This article is published in Aviation Week & Space Technology and is free to read until Oct 03, 2026. If you want to read more articles from this publication, please click the link to subscribe.
Opinion: Weapons Developments Reflect And Enable New Geopolitical Reality
The British-Italian-Japanese Global Combat Air Program could attract more partners.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in January popularized the term Middle Powers to refer to major democracies, like Canada, and other countries that once regarded the U.S. as an ally but now increasingly view it as either uninterested in free trade and global alliances or as an outright threat.
Carney hoped these countries would form a counterweight to Russia, China and the U.S. to preserve the post-World War II rules-based order. But, unsurprisingly, the Middle Powers have had a very slow start coordinating security, trade and regulatory policies. They are nonetheless beginning to affect military aerospace, and two developments this summer made an impact on combat aircraft and missile markets.
One involves the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), which Canada joined with observer status in July. This UK-Japanese-Italian fighter has the potential to be the flagship defense program for the Middle Powers, particularly if Australia, Germany, Sweden and other countries follow Canada as partners or export customers.
Even as currently structured, GCAP will be the first global fighter, designed and built in multiple continents, that does not revolve around the U.S. or involve the U.S. at all—kind of a Global Strike Fighter. The four countries involved are Lockheed Martin F-35 partners or customers. There have been pan-European fighters for more than 50 years, but GCAP is the first time Japan has worked on a fighter with countries other than the U.S. It may also be the first time Canada has worked on a fighter with countries other than the U.S.
The second development involves the pursuit of long-range strike capabilities. Also in July, 12 European countries, led by the UK, agreed to commit $50 billion over the next 10 years to develop multiple new weapons under the Deep Precision Strike Capability Investment Initiative.
The increased need for long-range precision strike capabilities, highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine and U.S./Israel-Iran wars, has resulted in a strong growth market for new and legacy systems. The U.S. and the other superpowers historically have had a lock on long-range precision strike weaponry, such as strategic bombers and cruise missiles. The Middle Powers want to change that.
The catalyst here is that the U.S. is seen as a less reliable ally. This summer’s European weapons initiative cites a “response to recent U.S. force adjustments” as a rationale for creating new systems. The Trump administration nixed a Biden-era plan to deploy long-range strike systems to Germany. Europe also has doubts about the U.S. as a weapon supplier, given the need to replenish depleted U.S. arsenals. The shelving of a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile sale to Germany this year clearly speaks to this fear.
With systems like the Fire Point FP-5 Flamingo, Ukraine has demonstrated that there are deep strike options beyond the U.S. Kyiv has also integrated MBDA’s Storm Shadow/Scalp air-launched cruise missile on its Sukhoi Su-24 bomber fleet. European startups like Destinus are offering Europe new options, and even legacy munitions providers are starting to propose alternatives. Outside Europe, new and improved long-range cruise missiles are being introduced by India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
These national systems are giving Middle Powers a new offensive capability. But they are not the only ones that might benefit from the proliferation of long-range precision strike. Iran’s use of long-range strike weapons to gain a strategic edge over a much more powerful adversary—as Ukraine has done with Russia—demonstrates the leverage that can be gained from these capabilities. As a response to Iran’s approach, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are creating national precision strike capabilities via their own companies—EDGE Group and SAMI, respectively.
U.S. companies will face hurdles in addressing this growth market. They need to design systems and components that are not subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions. Perhaps most of all, there will be big opportunities in long-range strike weapon propulsion, where there are high entry barriers and new technical challenges (AW&ST Aug. 31-Sept. 13, p. 66).
The world’s Middle Powers have a long way to go in creating joint weapons that are independent from the U.S. But they are gaining traction. And for U.S. companies, the challenge is clear: Develop systems and technologies designed to enable this growth trend, and profit from it.




