Boeing begins eight-month 787 certification run

US manufacturer Boeing has started 2010 as planned, with the first flight of its new 787 jetliner finally achieved after a series of problems that delayed the project for 28 months. The aircraft, designed to replace the 767 and produced by international partners who share programme costs and risks, offers “no-bleed” engines, “more-electric” systems, new cabin concepts, and – not least – a composites structure. Ian Goold summarizes developments as flight-testing gets under way.

After an accumulated delay of almost two-and-a-half years, the new Rolls-Royce Trent 1000-engined Boeing 787 flew for the first time on December 15 at the beginning of a certification programme the company hopes will culminate in delivery to launch operator All Nippon Airways before the end of this year.

As often happens, not everything went according to plan: the flight was curtailed by poor weather that obscured the 787’s visibility to ‘chase’ aircraft. (More dramatically, on other first flights, the 747 had suffered a small structural failure, the 767 had been unable to retract its landing-gear and the 757 had flown for several minutes on one engine after the other failed to relight immediately following a deliberate shutdown.)

Boeing aims to provide a better flying “experience” and greater efficiency to operators with the 787 which, it claims, will burn 20 per cent less fuel than current machines of similar size and offer up to 45 per cent greater cargo revenue capacity. Travellers will enjoy an enhanced cabin environment that includes cleaner air, larger windows, increased stowage volume, better lighting, and other perquisites.

The 787’s first flight was welcome news for airline and lease customers in the Middle East that have placed orders for the machine. As at December 1, Boeing figures showed seven companies in the region were planning to acquire some 135 examples, among a total of 55 customers that had ordered 840 787s overall.

Waiting longest for the first flight has been UAE-based lessor LCAL, which ordered five Rolls-Royce Trent 1000-powered 787s almost five years ago in May 2005. No other Middle East customer has specified R-R engines.

Another lease company, Kuwait ’s ALAFCO, followed with an order for six GEnx-engined 787s in September 2006, six more six months later, and a further ten in July 2007.

Other 2007 customers were Royal Jordanian (two separate pairs of 787s), Qatar Airways (30), and lessor Dubai Aerospace Enterprise (15). Abu Dhabi carrier Etihad Airways ordered 35 aircraft in 2008, while Gulf Air in Bahrain ordered 16 (plus eight more in 2009). All aircraft are 787-800s (marketed as 787-8s) except those for Etihad, which are -900s (787-9s). Qatar Airways has been very vocal in expressing its disappointment at the delays and in seeking assurances about the delivery schedule for its aircraft.

The 787s ordered by Middle East carriers will contribute to a 20-year, $200 billion market for some 850 twin-aisle passenger and freight jetliners foreseen in the region by Boeing. The manufacturer predicts a 2028 Middle East twin-aisle fleet of some 900 machines, with about 310 current aircraft having been retired in the ensuing period.

The new 787 capacity will be needed to support local airlines’ expansion on major network services. Boeing says that Middle East originating traffic (revenue passenger-miles/kilometres) flying within the region and to Asia/Pacific and North America markets will grow at more than six per cent per year during 2009-28, slightly ahead of five-and-a-half per cent annual growth predicted on routes to Europe .

The much-heralded new twin-aisle twinjet had been slated to fly in late August 2007 (“or within a month”) and enter service just eight months later, but dramatically and expensively it ran into problems that resulted in six delays. The maiden flight followed tests of a successful repair to delaminations found in the carbon fibre wing-root structure during static load testing.

Initial delays had been triggered when out-sourced major sub-assemblies arrived from offshore 787 partners incompletely plumbed and wired, or with parts or paperwork missing, as Boeing sought to maintain momentum with the fast-paced schedule. The manufacturer had needed to parachute more than 100 engineers into its partner companies in an effort to expedite the first sub-assemblies for 787 No 1. Later delays included problems with fasteners, such that the aircraft was woefully incomplete when formally rolled out in July 2007.

Given that current jetliners are likely to be be operated for 50 or 60 years, with longer periods between new designs entering service, opportunities for engineers to develop clean sheet (or, rather, computer screen) designs are few and far between, meaning there is little opportunity to accrue experience. Engineers might get just one such chance in a long career.

Forensic consideration of the many causal factors contributing to the accident suggests many circumstances taken together might all have played a part. Taking a broad view, the company’s loss of market leadership to European nose-to-nose competitor Airbus must be one consideration, especially after Boeing concluded the very-large aircraft market was “not big enough for the two of them”.

This may have been compounded by a loss of confidence in Boeing Commercial Airplanes when company head office was moved to Chicago . On the one hand, Seattle workers no longer were cosily next door to headquarters while, on the other, there was no longer a temptation for employees in other divisions based elsewhere to feel they were somehow poor relations to the commercial-aircraft business.

Other considerations in analysing the pre-flight debacle include:

• the urgency of the 787 programme (to fly the aircraft and to achieve certification in eight months);

• use of a much-larger proportion (50 per cent by weight) of composites material;

• contracting of so much work to partners;

• partners having to fit equipment and systems into “their” sub-assemblies;

• much greater reliance on computers for solutions; and

• a requirement to support Boeing’s drive for shareholder value.

A combination of some or all of these circumstances may have played a part.

Before an estimated 12,000-strong crowd of employees and guests, the first of six 787s in the flight-test programme lifted off from Paine Field in Everett (Washington state) in the hands of 787 chief pilot Captain Mike Carriker. It flew for just over three hours before landing at Boeing Field, Seattle , a planned longer flight having been curtailed by deteriorating weather that hampered observation of the aircraft from accompanying observation aircraft.

Carriker was accompanied by Captain Randall Neville, who helped to test some of the airplane’s systems and structures, while on-board test equipment recorded and transmitted real-time data. “We figured out more things about this aircraft after 10 minutes of flying than we had in the previous 100 days of ground testing,” said Carriker after the first flight.

“There was a lot of climbing, turning, descending to avoid weather,” said Neville. Even though Boeing has now provided more time in the 787 flight-test and delivery programme than originally scheduled, Neville said the company now would stay with the aggressive seven-to-eight-month certification programme. “We’re not changing the plan,” he said.

The event marked the beginning of a 6,000hr flight and ground-test schedule that should culminate in formal Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness-approval being granted in time for at least one aircraft to be delivered to launch customer All Nippon Airways by the end of the year. Two of the flight-test 787s will be powered by General Electric GEnx engines.

The 787 was launched (as the 7E7) seven years ago in 2003 as a family of jetliners aimed at replacing the established Model 767, while also providing additional range. Three or four variants are offered in the 200-300 seat class to fly on routes of 3,500-8,500 nautical miles (6,500-16,000km).