A jet engine maker is pressuring the U.S. Defense Department to scrap a plan to award a sole-source contract to a rival for a fleet of new fighters and investigate the opportunity for performance and cost improvements yielded by a competitive selection process.
If that narrative sounds familiar, it is because it echoes a role GE Aviation played for more than 40 years, which included a successful bid in the 1980s to launch the “Great Engine War” over the F-15 and F-16 fleets and a failed campaign that ended almost a decade ago to establish the F136 as the alternate engine for the F-35.
- Legal ruling expected by July for Pratt’s two protests
- USAF warns competition would cause 2-3-year delay
This time, however, the roles are reversed. Pratt & Whitney, which waged fierce lobbying campaigns against competitive engine policies for the F-15, F-16 and F-35, has switched sides in the debate.
In response to the U.S. Air Force’s decision to field the F-15EX into production powered solely by GE F110 engines, Pratt has filed two protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is scheduled to render judgments on both cases by early July.
The Air Force sided with GE during the Great Engine War in 1984. Seeking to lower costs and motivate Pratt to resolve stall-stagnation problems with the original F100, the Air Force decided that year to split the engine contract for the F-15 and F-16 between GE’s F110 and Pratt’s F100.
Thirty-six years later, the Air Force now worries about the schedule impact if the GAO sustains either or both of Pratt’s protests of the F-15EX engine. Service officials decided to acquire the F-15EX after concluding the F-15C/Ds were too costly to sustain and because it would take too long for the Pratt F135-powered F-35A to replace all of them.
Pratt’s protests threaten to disrupt that schedule and erode the Air Force’s original business case for the F-15EX.
“If we have to do an engine competition, it will add time—2-3 years,” said Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on March 10.
Only a decade ago, Pratt welcomed a vote by Congress in 2010 to cancel funding for the F-35 program’s alternate engine, along with a decision by GE and Rolls-Royce a year later to abandon a plan to self-fund the certification of the F136. But Pratt now embraces the potential benefits of an engine competition for the F-15EX.
“Our government supports competition at all levels, and we’re interested in providing the F100 as a competitive alternative,” Pratt Military Engines President Matthew Bromberg told Aviation Week. “If we’re not competitive in terms of capability, schedule [and] price, I get it. But after the U.S. government spent all this money creating two engines for the F-15 and F-16 platforms, why would it then not compete a 450-engine program?”
Asked if the existing F100 would require additional development to meet the Air Force’s requirements for the F-15EX, Bromberg replied that he cannot answer that question in the absence of a competitive process that allows Pratt access to the specifications. He also noted that the F100 exclusively powers the Air Force’s existing fleet of F-15Es.
The F100 and F110 were designed to fit interchangeably in the F-15, although the heavily modified Saudi Arabian F-15SA and the Qatari F-15QA from which the F-15EX was derived are exclusively powered by GE’s engine.
The GAO does not release complaints filed by protesters up front, but it does release the full text of decisions. It is not clear why Pratt filed two separate protests on the sole-source decision for the GE engine on the F-15EX, but Bromberg advised not reading too much into it.
“I’d like to obviously be able to discuss them, but I can’t because it’s a legal process,” Bromberg said. “I would really view them as a single protest on a single procurement action, and that is a lack of competition.”
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DEAR AIR FORCE: SPEED IS GOOD BUT COMPETITION IS BETTER
John Michael Loh
The Air Force has become a leader in defense acquisition by pursuing clever ways to shorten the acquisition process bypassing traditional, onerous steps to field new aircraft, missiles and drones. Today, speed is the mantra in the defense acquisition community and the Air Force constantly seeks new ways to shorten the development cycle. However, speed in the pursuit of rapid fielding should never happen at the expense of competition.
The Air Force plans to procure a large number of new Boeing F-15EX fighters to replace aging F-15Cs . This program is on a fast track so that the replacement F-15EXs are fielded before the F-15Cs are grounded at the end of their structural life .
In its haste, the Air Force is buying the engines, two per F-15EX, on a sole source contract from General Electric rather than on a competitive basis despite the availability of Pratt & Whitney engines already flying on nearly all its F-15Es. The GE engines will be provided to Boeing from the Air Force as Government Furnished Equipment.
This is a curious decision because the Air Force has strongly advocated competitive buys for engines whenever possible. The F-15EX program contemplates the procurement of several hundred aircraft and upwards of 500-700 engines, clearly a sufficient quantity to reap the benefits of competition.
The Air Force learned the enduring value of competition for fighter engines in the Great Engine War of the early 1980s. The Air Force was able to buy engines for F-15s and F-16s competitively each year from both GE and Pratt. The Air Force varied the ratio of engines from each annually based on contractor performance and price under competition.
In the process, the Air Force learned many lessons about engine procurements and acquisition strategies that has served it well since. The Great Engine War produced higher quality engines from both GE and Pratt at lower cost with better reliability and powerful warranties to guarantee performance and support costs for the life of the engines.
The most important lesson learned was the value of competition throughout the development and procurement cycles. Competition inspired innovation and brought out the best of both GE and Pratt designers and engineers. It forced the business side of each company to sharpen its pencils for negotiating in the competitive arena. Moreover, as a direct result of the Great Engine War, laws were passed to strengthen the requirement for competition in contracting for defense products, most notably for engines and engine parts. The Air Force was the leader in seeing these laws enacted by Congress.
Therefore, it is out of character for the Air Force to pursue a sole source contract for this program when more than one contractor is qualified to provide the engines. It flies in the face of Air Force acquisition doctrine – and the law.
The F-15EX is a new model of the Air Force F-15E. The Air Force has procured more than 225 F-15Es over the years powered by Pratt engines. The F-15EX is an ideal program for a full and open engine competition.
The Air Force should be commended for its aggressive pursuit of alternative acquisition strategies to shorten the cycle time from concept to production. But, while it invents techniques to go fast, it must not discard competition as the first principle and bedrock of smart acquisition. Competition for engines should not delay the overall F-15EX program. On the contrary, it will yield significant positive benefits for the life of the program.
General John Michael Loh, USAF (ret.,) is a former Air Force vice chief of staff and former commander of Air Combat Command.
,
DEAR AIR FORCE: SPEED IS GOOD BUT COMPETITION IS BETTER
John Michael Loh
The Air Force has become a leader in defense acquisition by pursuing clever ways to shorten the acquisition process bypassing traditional, onerous steps to field new aircraft, missiles and drones. Today, speed is the mantra in the defense acquisition community and the Air Force constantly seeks new ways to shorten the development cycle. However, speed in the pursuit of rapid fielding should never happen at the expense of competition.
The Air Force plans to procure a large number of new Boeing F-15EX fighters to replace aging F-15Cs . This program is on a fast track so that the replacement F-15EXs are fielded before the F-15Cs are grounded at the end of their structural life .
In its haste, the Air Force is buying the engines, two per F-15EX, on a sole source contract from General Electric rather than on a competitive basis despite the availability of Pratt & Whitney engines already flying on nearly all its F-15Es. The GE engines will be provided to Boeing from the Air Force as Government Furnished Equipment.
This is a curious decision because the Air Force has strongly advocated competitive buys for engines whenever possible. The F-15EX program contemplates the procurement of several hundred aircraft and upwards of 500-700 engines, clearly a sufficient quantity to reap the benefits of competition.
The Air Force learned the enduring value of competition for fighter engines in the Great Engine War of the early 1980s. The Air Force was able to buy engines for F-15s and F-16s competitively each year from both GE and Pratt. The Air Force varied the ratio of engines from each annually based on contractor performance and price under competition.
In the process, the Air Force learned many lessons about engine procurements and acquisition strategies that has served it well since. The Great Engine War produced higher quality engines from both GE and Pratt at lower cost with better reliability and powerful warranties to guarantee performance and support costs for the life of the engines.
The most important lesson learned was the value of competition throughout the development and procurement cycles. Competition inspired innovation and brought out the best of both GE and Pratt designers and engineers. It forced the business side of each company to sharpen its pencils for negotiating in the competitive arena. Moreover, as a direct result of the Great Engine War, laws were passed to strengthen the requirement for competition in contracting for defense products, most notably for engines and engine parts. The Air Force was the leader in seeing these laws enacted by Congress.
Therefore, it is out of character for the Air Force to pursue a sole source contract for this program when more than one contractor is qualified to provide the engines. It flies in the face of Air Force acquisition doctrine – and the law.
The F-15EX is a new model of the Air Force F-15E. The Air Force has procured more than 225 F-15Es over the years powered by Pratt engines. The F-15EX is an ideal program for a full and open engine competition.
The Air Force should be commended for its aggressive pursuit of alternative acquisition strategies to shorten the cycle time from concept to production. But, while it invents techniques to go fast, it must not discard competition as the first principle and bedrock of smart acquisition. Competition for engines should not delay the overall F-15EX program. On the contrary, it will yield significant positive benefits for the life of the program.
General John Michael Loh, USAF (ret.,) is a former Air Force vice chief of staff and former commander of Air Combat Command.
,
DEAR AIR FORCE: SPEED IS GOOD BUT COMPETITION IS BETTER
John Michael Loh
The Air Force has become a leader in defense acquisition by pursuing clever ways to shorten the acquisition process bypassing traditional, onerous steps to field new aircraft, missiles and drones. Today, speed is the mantra in the defense acquisition community and the Air Force constantly seeks new ways to shorten the development cycle. However, speed in the pursuit of rapid fielding should never happen at the expense of competition.
The Air Force plans to procure a large number of new Boeing F-15EX fighters to replace aging F-15Cs . This program is on a fast track so that the replacement F-15EXs are fielded before the F-15Cs are grounded at the end of their structural life .
In its haste, the Air Force is buying the engines, two per F-15EX, on a sole source contract from General Electric rather than on a competitive basis despite the availability of Pratt & Whitney engines already flying on nearly all its F-15Es. The GE engines will be provided to Boeing from the Air Force as Government Furnished Equipment.
This is a curious decision because the Air Force has strongly advocated competitive buys for engines whenever possible. The F-15EX program contemplates the procurement of several hundred aircraft and upwards of 500-700 engines, clearly a sufficient quantity to reap the benefits of competition.
The Air Force learned the enduring value of competition for fighter engines in the Great Engine War of the early 1980s. The Air Force was able to buy engines for F-15s and F-16s competitively each year from both GE and Pratt. The Air Force varied the ratio of engines from each annually based on contractor performance and price under competition.
In the process, the Air Force learned many lessons about engine procurements and acquisition strategies that has served it well since. The Great Engine War produced higher quality engines from both GE and Pratt at lower cost with better reliability and powerful warranties to guarantee performance and support costs for the life of the engines.
The most important lesson learned was the value of competition throughout the development and procurement cycles. Competition inspired innovation and brought out the best of both GE and Pratt designers and engineers. It forced the business side of each company to sharpen its pencils for negotiating in the competitive arena. Moreover, as a direct result of the Great Engine War, laws were passed to strengthen the requirement for competition in contracting for defense products, most notably for engines and engine parts. The Air Force was the leader in seeing these laws enacted by Congress.
Therefore, it is out of character for the Air Force to pursue a sole source contract for this program when more than one contractor is qualified to provide the engines. It flies in the face of Air Force acquisition doctrine – and the law.
The F-15EX is a new model of the Air Force F-15E. The Air Force has procured more than 225 F-15Es over the years powered by Pratt engines. The F-15EX is an ideal program for a full and open engine competition.
The Air Force should be commended for its aggressive pursuit of alternative acquisition strategies to shorten the cycle time from concept to production. But, while it invents techniques to go fast, it must not discard competition as the first principle and bedrock of smart acquisition. Competition for engines should not delay the overall F-15EX program. On the contrary, it will yield significant positive benefits for the life of the program.
General John Michael Loh, USAF (ret.,) is a former Air Force vice chief of staff and former commander of Air Combat Command.
,
The F-15EX is based off of the recent export models which have all used GE F110's, so a P&W engine would have to be re-certified for the F-15EX which equals a delay.
Where was the competition for the F-35 engine when P&W got the sole-source contract? GE had a better engine and got froze out.
P&W is being extremely selfish & words I won't type.
I doubt if total costs drops by minimum 5% using the PW engine.