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An ATC screen display of ADS-B targets.
For private aircraft owners, the irony is clear and a telling footnote in their long-standing quest to restrict a proven technology to its original purpose.
The matter at hand involves a float-equipped Taylorcraft used in flight instruction one day last May. The aircraft conducted multiple takeoffs and landings on the Connecticut River, including a stretch approximately 1,800 ft. south of a vehicular bridge.
Seaplane pilots have used that section of the river for years. There is no regulation prohibiting takeoffs and landings, nor any charted or published restrictions on such operations.
Seven months later, the pilot received a notification from the FAA accusing him of flying less than 500 ft. above the ground-level connector, constituting a “careless or reckless” operation for which the agency planned to suspend his pilot certificate for 120 days.
The notice did not explain how the agency came to that conclusion, but the suspicion is that it relied on data from the light aircraft’s automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) system.
The pilot is appealing the proposed suspension. Notably, he is an FAA employee and is understandably concerned about any adverse effect the proceedings might have on his job status. Representing him is a former FAA enforcement attorney affiliated with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA).
This scenario was not what ADS-B supporters had in mind when its wide use was promoted in 2010 and earlier. Intended to complement radar-based aircraft surveillance for air traffic control (ATC), the technology automatically transmits satellite-derived position information, along with velocity, altitude and other data. Unlike secondary surveillance radar, ADS-B does not require an interrogation signal from the ground to transmit and can interact with similarly equipped aircraft.
As of January 2020, the FAA required equipage of ADS-B for aircraft to operate in most controlled airspace. Since then, ADS-B has been progressively adopted by ATC systems worldwide.
The demonstrated capabilities of ADS-B have received favorable reactions. Jim Coon, AOPA senior vice president of government affairs and advocacy, expresses the opinion of many when describing the technology as “an amazing safety tool.”
He also notes, however, that the tool can be misused for nuisance lawsuits, dubious enforcement actions, billing landing and other fees, and live tracking of targeted aircraft. Those actions result from internal, vendor and public access to and storage of ADS-B data.
While air traffic controllers use the information to direct aircraft safely and efficiently, they are not its only users. Since ADS-B broadcasts in the open, not within some closed private or government network, any entities with appropriate equipment can receive and process the transmitted data. And they do.
Consequently, a global network exists of data collectors and suppliers, ranging from hobbyists and focused trackers to subscription services for profit, or not, such as the FAA. Vendors that use FAA-collected data agree to abide by the agency’s rules; the hundreds of independent data collectors make their own.
Thus, a homeowner worried about a low-flying aircraft could access collected data, identify the aircraft and its registration number, use the FAA’s aircraft registry to find the owner’s name and address and then take action. Further, a growing list of small airports are billing operators for new landing fees because ADS-B facilitates the process (AW&ST Nov. 25-Dec. 8, 2024, p. 12). Some business entities track competitors’ aircraft to identify patterns they can use for their own benefit. Other collectors post movements of celebrities’ aircraft, just because.
Those kinds of nonsafety activities have generated great concern and ill will among private pilots, aviation associations and elected officials.
Accordingly, the FAA responded by allowing owners to have their aircraft data blocked through the Limited Aircraft Data Displayed and the international Privacy ICAO Address programs, which are exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests. To comply with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, the agency will, if asked, remove any owner’s name and address from its aircraft registry.
While those and any future moves by the FAA to protect owners’ privacy are helpful, they involve agency-controlled data. The independents likely will adapt to the changes and continue their unwelcome ways.
As for unwanted landing fees and one fretful floatplane pilot’s job security, those matters have yet to be resolved.
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