观点 ：削减飞机产量的理由 | The Case For More Aircraft Production Cuts

自从3月份新冠病毒疫情在全球流行以来，民用航空产业几乎遭到“横扫”，飞机产量直线下降。疫情爆发以来，有很多关于飞机产量何时恢复“正常”的讨论，而在整个行业中，很多航空制造业企业的CEO都将“正常”定义为2019年的情况。然而在仔细研究过市场预测和计划生产率表明，将2019年的情况确定为“正常“的基准是错误选择。

Since the COVID-19 pandemic waylaid commercial aviation in March, there has been much talk about when aircraft production volumes will return to “normal.” Across the industry, leading CEOs have defined “normal” as 2019. But a closer look at earlier market forecasts and planned production rates shows that 2019 is the wrong benchmark.

尽管2019年的传统观点认为，空客和波音仍将提高产量，而且还计划在未来建造更多飞机，但实际上两家飞机制造商生产的飞机已经超过市场吸收能力。

Although conventional wisdom last year was that Airbus and Boeing would raise output ever higher, the two aircraft manufacturers already were producing more airplanes than the market could absorb and were planning to build significantly more in the future. Let’s do the math.

空客公司在2019年预测，未来20年内将需要39000架100座以上级别的飞机，平均每年需求1970架。这一数字与波音的预测大致相符。如果假设两家公司平分市场，那么波音和空客每年将需要生产985架飞机。但实际上这个数字已经过高，因为它没有考虑巴西航工业、中国商飞或俄罗斯的联合飞机公司的飞机销量。另外，也许会出现一个市场颠覆企业，在未来的几十年内可能制造出首架100座级的混合动力飞机。

In 2019, Airbus projected demand for 39,000 aircraft of 100 seats or more over the next 20 years—an average of 1,970 annually and a figure roughly in line with Boeing’s forecast. If the two companies split the market 50-50, each would have demand for 985 aircraft a year. But that number already is too high because it does not take into account sales by Brazil’s Embraer, China’s Comac or Russia’s United Aircraft Corp. It is also possible that another company, perhaps a market disruptor, could build the first hybrid-electric 100-seater in the next couple of decades.

空客公司在2019年交付了863架飞机，接近其预测的未来20年平均交付量；而波音公司受波音737MAX事件的影响，2019年只交付了380架飞机，但波音在当初的交付计划也达到了860架。因此如果没有波音737MAX的影响，波音和空客在2019年将交付约1840架飞机。这个数量已经较为接近未来20年的年均交付量，这表明即使在2020年的新冠疫情出现之前，未来这两家公司的飞机交付量也几乎没有了增长的空间；再考虑到其他飞机制造商的飞机交付，甚至现在可以推测波音和空客都已经出现了严重的生产过剩（失去的未来的增长机会），尤其是在窄体机领域。

Airbus delivered 863 aircraft in 2019, reasonably close to its allocation of the forecast 20-year average; Boeing planned to build and hand over about 860 jets last year, for a combined total of approximately 1,840 aircraft. Boeing ultimately delivered just 380 units because of the 737 MAX grounding, but the point is that both companies were planning to build nearly as many aircraft as their average forecast for the next 20 years. In other words, even before the biggest downturn in aviation history, no room for any production growth existed. Take the other aircraft manufacturers into account, and you could surmise there already was significant overproduction, particularly in the narrowbody segment.

当然，新冠病毒疫情的流行已使这些研究和生产计划变的无关紧要，但整个行业需要意识到在疫情之前的生产计划已经是不现实的。也许事实并不会那么严重，但制造商的梦想不可能变成现实。

Of course, the fallout from the novel coronavirus pandemic has made all these studies and production plans irrelevant. But industry needs to realize its pre-COVID-19 plans were already unrealistic. One way or another, it had to go wrong, maybe not as dramatically as it turned out, but there was no way the dreams could have become reality.

这是毫不奇怪的，制造商们在疫情危机期间已经出现了生产过剩的迹象。例如空客（在需求如此不确定的情况下）将产量仅仅削减了1/3，目的是保持尽可能高的生产水平。而波音公司希望交付出库存737MAX的同时生产新的737MAX。空中客车公司已经在生产大量的白尾飞机（尚无客户需求的飞机），而航空公司可能被迫接受明显不想要、也无法负担的起的飞机。

To no one’s surprise, the signs of overproduction have been visible during the crisis. Airbus cut output by only one-third, aiming to keep as high a level as possible. Boeing wants to hand over the undelivered stored MAXs and ramp up production of new ones at the same time. Essentially, airlines may be forced to accept aircraft they clearly do not want and cannot afford. Airbus is already producing a significant number of white tails, something it had promised to avoid.

现在的情况下继续保持高产量是短视的行为。这种行为牺牲了航空公司用户的未来，特别是他们现在都面对着巨大的财务压力。而且一旦航空公司准备提供更多的运力而增加对飞机的需求时，现在的高产量对于飞机未来的定价也是不利的。届时租赁公司也将拥有足够的运力，而且航空公司可能也会处理一些廉价的、几乎全新的飞机。但是，大幅削减产量可能会破坏供应链。而令人苦恼的事实是，尽管供应链的某些企业在努力跟上疫情危机爆发之前的生产节奏，但现在的产能已经过剩，而且产能过剩将持续数年。

Keeping production high now is short-sighted. It weakens airline customers further during a time of huge financial pressure. It is also bad for future pricing once airlines are ready to take more aircraft. There will be ample capacity from lessors or cheap, almost brand-new aircraft that operators want to dispose of. Arguably, steep cuts in production could ruin the supply chain. But the bitter truth is that although some parts of the supply chain were struggling to keep up with the tempo before the crisis, there is now far too much capacity. And clearly, an excess of capacity will continue for years.

可以理解的是，企业管理层希望将损失降到最低，并且需要时间来消化过去几个月来雪崩般出现的坏消息。企业财务和市场压力也很明显：交付量越少，收入越少，市场份额也就越小。波音公司已经因波音737MAX的生产中断而受到严重损害，而且飞机的客户满意度令人失望，因此波音十分希望抑制市场份额的进一步损失。

Management understandably wants to minimize the damage and needs time to digest the avalanche of bad news over the past few months. The financial and market pressures are also obvious: the fewer deliveries, the less revenue and the smaller the market share. Boeing, already badly damaged by the MAX production interruption and that aircraft’s disappointing reception by customers, has every incentive to contain any further loss of market share.

尽管如此，更艰难的决定仍在继续。在波音方面，重新引入波音737MAX的速度较慢已是不可避免的，这与波音777X未来入役的过程也将非常缓慢一样。而空客将不得不进一步削减窄体机的产量，如果国际航班不能很快的恢复（目前也没有迹象表明会恢复），那么空客公司还必须对A350和A330neo的价格进行调整，这也可能是痛苦的过程。

Nonetheless, more tough decisions loom. On the Boeing side, a slower reintroduction of the MAX is inevitable, as is a very slow service-entry process for the 777X. Airbus will have to cut narrowbody output further. If long-haul travel does not return quickly—and no indications suggest it will—Airbus will also have to take another hard look at A350 and A330neo rates, as painful as that may be.

需要记住的是，一旦市场需求恢复，过去的生产计划是不现实的，认清这一点尤其重要。这次需要采用更严格的手段来重新计划生产，尽管市场竞争的激励措施可能会起到相反的作用。

Remembering that earlier plans were unrealistic will be particularly important once demand recovers. A more measured approach is needed this time despite competitive incentives to do the opposite.

这条消息是Jens Flottau在 Aviation Week & Space Technology 发表的文章。加入航空周刊情报网(AWIN)会员，访问公司、项目、机队和联系人数据库，获取权威解析与市场情报并找到新的业务机会。点击击此预约您的产品演示。