Helicopter In DCA Collision Was Above Required Altitude, NTSB Data Shows

The Army helicopter that struck an American Airlines regional jet on approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) Jan. 29 was flying at least 100 ft. higher than its prescribed flightpath’s maximum 200-ft. altitude and may have been climbing, new information from NTSB investigators indicates.

Investigators have confirmed with near certainty that the collision occurred at 325 ft., “plus or minus 25 ft.,” based on data from the Bombardier CRJ-700’s flight data recorder (FDR) and other sources, NTSB member Todd Inman said in a press briefing late Feb. 1. The figure represents the regional jet’s confirmed altitude when the collision occurred.

“Obviously an impact occurred,” Inman said. “When an impact occurs, that is typically where the altitude of both aircraft were at the moment.”

Investigators are still analyzing information from the Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk’s combined FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to independently validate its altitude, cockpit conversation and other parameters. They expect to have more granular altitude data in a day or two, Inman said.

Brice Banning, the NTSB investigator in charge of the accident, confirmed that the Black Hawk—operating under call sign PAT-25—was following its assigned path, helicopter Route 4, at the time of impact, but was apparently too high.

“PAT-25 was within the lateral boundaries of a helicopter route,” he said. “The ceiling of that route was 200 ft. We have not gotten the data out of the FDR for the Black Hawk at this time, but that’s what we know.”

Inman said that air traffic control (ATC) radar scope altitude data shows PAT-25 was at 200 ft. at the time of impact. “That needs to be verified,” he continued, adding that radar scope data “may [have] a 4-5 sec. refresh rate.”

The scope data suggests the Black Hawk may have been climbing just before the collision—one of many details that the helicopter’s FDR data will help fill in. It also could help explain an apparent lack of urgency from controllers as the two aircraft converged.

The NTSB’s update included a preliminary timeline of each aircraft’s flight leading up to the collision.

Among the key new details confirmed by investigators: The CRJ crew received at least one alert from its traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), about 20 sec. before the collision. It is not clear if the alert was triggered by the Black Hawk or another aircraft in the area.

NTSB also confirmed that a tower controller first informed the Black Hawk pilots about the CRJ about 2 min. before the collision. ATC followed up with the Black Hawk, asking if the pilots had the CRJ in sight, 20 sec. before impact. Responses from the Black Hawk have not been validated.

DCA’s control tower cab had five controllers working at the time of the accident, Inman said. One was a local controller handling both fixed-wing and helicopter traffic the night of the accident, NTSB said. A second local controller was assigned to departures and arrivals. A ground controller was managing surface vehicles not on a runway. A fourth controller was designated to assist the local controllers. The fifth staffer was a supervisor.

The CRJ, American Flight 5342 operated by wholly owned subsidiary PSA Airlines and en route from Wichita, was cleared for an instrument approach to DCA’s Runway 1 at 2039 local time, Banning said.

Seven minutes later, at 2043, the CRJ crew made its initial contact with DCA tower controllers. The CRJ was asked to switch to Runway 33 and make a circling approach. “After a brief discussion” with each other, the CRJ pilots agreed, Banning said.

At 2046, a DCA tower controller informed PAT-25 of traffic in the area—a CRJ at about 1,200 ft. “just south of the Wilson Bridge,” or about 3 nm from the airport—and was circling to Runway 33, Banning said.

At 2047:29, the CRJ descended through 500 ft. on its visual approach to Runway 33, a flightpath that intersects helicopter Route 4.

Ten seconds later, the tower controller asked PAT-25 if the helicopter pilots had the CRJ in sight.

At the same time, the CRJ pilots received an automated, aural “traffic traffic” alert from the aircraft’s TCAS, Banning said.

At 2047:42, a DCA tower controller instructs the Black Hawk to pass behind the CRJ, Banning said. He did not detail any response.

Sixteen seconds later, at 2047:58, the CRJ crew “had verbal reaction” and FDR data show the aircraft’s pitch was increasing, Banning said.

“Sounds of impact were audible about 1 sec. later, followed by the end of the recording,” Banning said.

The Black Hawk was transmitting in UHF and the CRJ in VHF, as is common in military and civil aviation, Inman said. But this meant the pilots of the respective aircraft could not hear each other, though the controllers, transmitting in both, heard all parties, Inman added.

The NTSB has not released any communication from ATC to the CRJ discussing helicopter traffic. Inman said detailed transcripts from ATC tapes and both CVRs are still being compiled.

Meanwhile, Inman also confirmed that NTSB is investigating a “close contact” of another priority air transport (PAT) helicopter flight, PAT-11, and an arriving Republic Airways regional jet that occurred Jan. 28. Preliminary information shows the helicopter was at least 1,000 ft. from the regional jet when the Republic crew elected to go around.

“One thousand feet is a good safety barrier,” Inman said. “Obviously the pilot made his own decision in rejecting the landing. It will be considered in the overall evaluation of this accident.”

This story has been updated with additional information.