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NTSB investigators document the wreckage of the aircraft involved in the mid-air collision near DCA.
Credit: NTSB
The NTSB is urging the FAA to take steps to ensure helicopter traffic is never permitted to cross arrival and departure paths at Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), eliminating a risk that the board suggests should have been addressed before the Jan. 29 midair collision of a regional jet and a U.S Army helicopter.
The board’s recommendations, made public March 11, call on the FAA to prohibit helicopter operations east of DCA when Runway 15/33 is in use. NTSB also said the FAA should come up with an alternate helicopter route to ensure more risks are not introduced by holding helicopter traffic.
DOT Secretary Sean Duffy said the FAA would accept the recommendations, extending a temporary ban put in place shortly after the collision.
"Why this information wasn't studied and known before Jan. 29 is an important question," Duffy said in a subsequent press briefing. "But based on that information and this crash, we are going to continue with our restrictions."
The FAA also will work with other stakeholders, including the Defense Department, to establish alternative helicopter routes.
The ban affects helicopter route 4, which runs along the Potomac River’s east bank and crosses the arrival end of Runway 33 at about 200 ft. above the river, or within 100 ft. of where an arriving aircraft should be. This spot is where American Eagle Flight 5432, an MHIRJ CRJ-700, and the Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk collided as the regional jet was on final approach to Runway 33. The collision occurred at 20:48 local time, in the dark. All 64 occupants on the regional jet and three on the helicopter were killed.
Details released so far indicate the Black Hawk was flying above the 200-ft. maximum altitude along route 4. While this may have contributed to the accident, the board’s recommendations make clear that the broader operational environment was too risky and should have been flagged by the FAA long before the disaster.
“There clearly were indicators where safety trending could have occurred,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy told reporters in a March 11 briefing. “Fortunately, we have a [DOT secretary] in place that is taking safety very seriously. But it shouldn’t take a tragedy to require immediate action.”
The FAA, which is part of the DOT, issued a temporary ban on most helicopter operations around DCA soon after the accident. But data reviewed by the NTSB, including publicly available reports filed by pilots and controllers, show the risks were documented years before the accident.
A preliminary NTSB review of FAA records shows that from 2011-24, commercial aircraft received an average of one traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory (RA) per month due to conflicts with helicopters near DCA. Most of the occurrences came during approaches, and two-thirds occurred at night.
Investigators also found that commercial aircraft and helicopters came within 1 nm mile laterally and 400 ft. vertically some 15,200 times on 974,000 operations from October 2021-December 2024. On 85 occasions, the separations were less than 1,500 ft. laterally and 200 ft. vertically.
“There’s a serious safety issue here, which is why we’re issuing these urgent safety recommendations,” said Homendy, who credited the FAA with its quick post-accident response. “Now we need to see that more permanent solution.”
Duffy acknowledged that the FAA's lack of action needs to be examined.
"I think the question is, when this data comes in, how did the FAA not know?" Duffy said. "How do they not study the data to say, 'Hey, this is a hot spot. We're having near misses, and if we don't change our way, we're going to lose lives.' That wasn't done."
DCA has three runways. An NTSB review of DCA operations found that Runway 15/33 handled about 5% of all arrivals and departures over the last five years. Most of the rest used the main runway, 1/19.
The NTSB’s recommendations stem from the ongoing probe. A preliminary report on the investigation released along with the recommendations sheds little new light on the accident sequence.
Investigators concluded that both aircraft had routine navigation and collision lights illuminated. The CRJ also had its right- and left-wing landing lights and upper and lower beacon lights on, the report added. None of the airplane’s lights were LEDs.
The helicopter’s active lights include the left, right and tail pylon position lights, the report said.
Detailed altitude data on the helicopter is still being compiled, Homendy said.
A review of communications between the local controller in DCA’s tower and both crews confirms the controller communicated with the Black Hawk crew twice about the inbound CRJ. Both times, the helicopter confirmed it had the airplane in sight, and requested visual separation, which was granted. This effectively made the helicopter responsible for ensuring separation, though controllers can always intervene.
There is no indication the controller informed the CRJ about the Black Hawk’s presence.
Both the CRJ and the Black Hawk were using VHF frequencies, but they were on different channels. This meant that while both crews could hear everything the controller said to each aircraft, they could not hear each other.
An NTSB review of DCA tower controller staffing on the day of the accident found the local controller and helicopter controller positions were combined, or being worked by one controller, at 1540—about five hours before the accident. A second controller was also working two positions—flight data and clearance delivery. Three other controllers were on duty working other positions, the report said.
Controller workload and communications protocols are among many factors the board will analyze as the probe continues. The initial recommendations point to an even larger focus on the FAA’s risk assessments of potential airspace safety issues.
This story has been updated with DOT's response.
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