High Or Low? Pilots Disagree On Right Approach, Part 2

While the pilots of Sierra West Flight 887 waited for a reply to their request for an ILS approach, the captain initiated the approach checklist. The checklist requires flight and nav instruments to be set and the approach briefing to be complete, but they still didn’t know if the glide slope was operative.

As the Falcon 20 neared the airfield, the captain and the controller held a rather pointless dialogue and neither one confirmed the status of the glide slope. The controller cleared the flight direct to CEDAR, the final approach fix, and the captain asked him to spell it. CEDAR is an NDB, frequency 341, morse code identifier “AA.” If the NDB had been tuned, the discussion would have been unnecessary.

From the transcript, it’s clear the captain did not have CEDAR tuned. He asked the controller for “an initial heading for CEDAR.” Instead, the controller told him to turn left 15 deg. for weather and cleared the flight to descend to 11,000 ft. As the jet approached the cleared altitude, the captain shouted “altitude,” and “I'll get— I'll get that. You fly the damn airplane. I don't want you to (kill) me.”

At 5:29:17, the flight was cleared down to 3,000 ft. The captain said: “okay that’s direct CEDAR that's one five five on the heading.” That was incorrect. They were headed in a northeasterly direction. The FO quickly said, “that’s wrong,” and the captain replied: “yeah yeah I’ll take care of it.” He was disoriented, and he asked the controller, “can we just get a vector for the final approach course?”

It was what he was expecting all along, but it didn’t work. The controller replied: “I am unable to do that in the enroute environment, unfortunately. Uh, I don’t depict the approaches and I’m not allowed to vector for it.”

Again, the captain asked the controller to spell CEDAR. It was 0532, and he was relying on the controller to give him the “AA” identifier for the fix. It was right on the plate. Then there was a strange remark by the first officer (FO). He said, “(I’m) loading alpha. I already loaded ANNAN.” What was he loading it into?  A device found in the wreckage might explain.

Whatever the FO did, the captain then announced they should fly a heading of 070 deg. and he resumed his coaching. From 0533 on, the captain kept up an almost continuous commentary, directing and redirecting altitude, speed, and heading. He was so focused on directing the FO that he mistakenly began transmitting on the wrong frequency.  His first attempt to trigger the runway lights went out on Guard frequency, as did his call to the center canceling IFR.

The jet flew through the localizer at 0542:23, right to left. Neither pilot called it out. They were at 2,600 ft. and their calibrated airspeed was 168 kts.

It was 0542:40 when the captain called the field in sight. The center said “platinum west eight eight seven uhh roger I have a different frequency there but I believe you said you wanted to cancel is that correct?” Then, “Platinum west uh no traffic observed between you and the field at this time. Cancelation IFR is received. Squawk VFR you guys have a good one.”

At 0543:06 the engines came back to idle. They were still fast, about 150 kts., high, and well left of course. At 0543:32, the captain said: “you gotta lose twenty knots here,” and “let's use your air brakes again.” The captain argued they were “way high” and the FO said: “no we’re not.”

At 0544:04, the captain said: “now you’re low.” There was a rapid increase in power. “You got trees here!” The stall warning sounded. The sound of the initial impact with the trees was at 0544:07. Two seconds later, the recording stopped.

The Falcon 20 passed through a copse of tall trees, shedding first the wingtips, then the left wing and left engine, and then the empennage. The cockpit, fuselage, right wing, and right engine stopped 0.7 mile from the runway threshold. The airbrakes were still deployed.

The Investigation
The NTSB investigator-in-charge, along with an FAA inspector and a representative from Dassault Aviation, arrived on scene the day of the accident. They were later assisted by representatives from the French BEA aviation safety agency, GE Commercial Flight Safety, and the director of operations of Sierra West Airlines.

During the course of the two-year, two-month investigation, NTSB specialists in aircraft performance, meteorology, operations, airworthiness, medical factors, and vehicle performance assisted. An engineer prepared a sound spectrum analysis and airport surveillance camera footage was recovered. Transcripts from the FAA’s Atlanta Center were obtained and integrated into the cockpit voice recorder report.

Investigators examined the wreckage, first at the scene, then later at a salvage facility in Griffin, Georgia. They found the landing gear and flaps extended and the speed brakes deployed. Measurement of the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew showed that the pitch trim was 4 deg. nose up. The flaps selector was in the full-down 40 deg. position, but the flaps were actually 25 deg. on the left side and 27 deg. on the right side.

The cockpit was thoroughly documented. The instruments were electric or electromechanical. The captain’s speed bug was set to 115 kts, the FO’s to 110 kts. Neither pilot’s course deviation indicator was set to the prescribed 097 deg. The captain’s CDI was set to 107 deg. and the FO’s to 095 deg. The left VHF radio was set to the ATC frequency of 119.77 and 110.10, and the right radio was set to Guard, 121.5, and the ILS frequency 110.75. ADF 1 was set to 800 and ADF 2 to 221.5. A Garmin GNS 530 GPS/nav/comm unit was found loose in the cockpit but provided no information.

Why the captain’s nav radio was set to 110.10 was unclear, as it did not correspond to any frequency in the Thompson area. It was also unclear why neither ADF was tuned to CEDAR.

Deploying the speed brakes contrary to the airplane flight manual was among the errors the flight crew made, in Part 3 of this article.

High Or Low? Pilots Disagree On Right Approach, Part 1: https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/safety-ops-regulation/high-o…